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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol was proposed to remove
all the detector side channel attacks, while its security relies on the trusted encoding systems. Here we propose
a one-sided MDI-QKD (1SMDI-QKD) protocol, which enjoys detection loophole-free advantage, and at the
same time weakens the state preparation assumption in MDI-QKD. The 1SMDI-QKD can be regarded as a
modified MDI-QKD, in which Bob’s encoding system is trusted, while Alice’s is uncharacterized. For the
practical implementation, we also provide a scheme by utilizing coherent light source with an analytical two
decoy state estimation method. Simulation with realistic experimental parameters shows that the protocol has a
promising performance, and thus can be applied to practical QKD applications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] enables two distant
parties to produce random common secret key bits which can
be used for secure communication. In theory, the uncondi-
tional security of QKD is guaranteed by the laws of quan-
tum mechanics [4–6]. In the usual security proof of QKD,
it is assumed that all the devices, both sources and measure-
ment devices, are trusted or well-characterized. In a realistic
setup, however, the imperfection of the practical devices leads
to various kinds of side-channel attacks, including fake-state
attack [7, 8], time-shift attack [9, 10], phase-remapping attack
[11, 12], detector-blinding attack [13, 14], dead time attack
[15], unambiguous state discrimination attack [16], etc. [17–
22].
As a result, on the route of realizing applications of QKD,
it is very crucial to bridge the gap between theoretical ex-
pectations and realistic setups. To connect theory with prac-
tice, several approaches have been proposed. A once-and-for-
all solution is device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) [23–27],
which allows all the devices (i.e., both sources and measure-
ment devices) being untrusted. Based on the violation of Bell
inequality, DI-QKD can defend against any possible eaves-
dropping. Although recently loophole-free Bell tests have
been carried out [28, 29], the DI-QKD is still very difficult
to be implemented. At the moment, what obstructs its prac-
tical application is not only the requirement of high detection
efficiency but also the quite low secure key rate at feasible
distances.
To make the realistic QKD applications more applicable,
one has to make more assumptions on the characterization of
devices. For such a purpose, one-sided device-independent
QKD (1SDI-QKD) [30, 31] has been proposed, where the
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measurement device on one side is assumed to be trusted.
The security of 1SDI-QKD is based on demonstration of EPR
steering [32–35], in analogy to the demonstration of Bell in-
equality in DI-QKD. The 1SDI-QKD enjoys the advantage of
a lower detection efficiency requirement than that of DI-QKD
[30], since it is easier to realize a loophole-free EPR steering
experiment [36–38] than a loophole-free Bell test. However,
the detection efficiency requirement of 1SDI-QKD is still too
high for a realistic QKD application, especially when the de-
sired communication distance is long [30].
Based on the time-reversed entanglement-based QKD [39–
41], the measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
[42, 43] was proposed to close all kinds of detection side-
channel attacks. The MDI-QKD is an attractive scheme for
practical implementations because of its high security and
long achievable distances. More recently, several MDI-QKD
experiments have been successfully carried out [44–50]. A
crucial assumption of MDI-QKD is that the state preparation
device is nearly perfect, while such requirements might not
be strictly satisfied in practice. For example, one’s encoding
device may be manufactured by a untrusted third party.
Furthermore, several protocols have been proposed [51–55]
to relax the assumptions on the encoding systems. By modify-
ing the original MDI-QKD and assuming qubit sources, Yin
et al. [51, 52] have proved that MDI-QKD can still be se-
cure with uncharacterized encoding systems. In [53], MDI-
QKD based on the CHSH inequality (CHSH-MDI-QKD) has
been investigated, in which the state is prepared in the two-
dimensional Hilbert space. In [54], the decoy state method
was combined with the CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol to guar-
antee its security when using a weak coherent state source. In
[55], a general technique that applies to any state preparation
flaws in phase-randomized sources was proposed, which has
been successfully carried out in experiments [56, 57]. With
regard to the theoretical analysis of point-to-point quantum
communications, the ideal optimal key rates with respect to
different scenarios were discussed in Ref. [58], where all pos-
sible local operations and classical communications are taken
into account.
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2In this paper, we propose a one-sided MDI-QKD (1SMDI-
QKD) protocol, which enjoys the detection loophole-free ad-
vantage, and at the same time weakens the state preparation
assumption in MDI-QKD. The 1SMDI-QKD can be regarded
as a modified MDI-QKD, in which Bob’s encoding system is
trusted, while Alice’s encoding system is uncharacterized. In
the single-photon case, Alice’s encoding system is assumed
to output a quantum state in a two-dimensional Hilbert space
basis-independently. This is the assumption we made about
Alice’s encoding system besides the common assumptions
of the single-photon MDI-QKD case. For the practical im-
plementation, we also propose a scheme by utilizing coher-
ent light source with an analytical two decoy state estimation
method. Besides, we provide a concise security analysis for
both the single-photon case and the decoy-state case, using a
virtual-photon qubit idea. Compared with the existing proto-
col [51–55], the security proof of our protocol is much more
straightforward, and the data post-processing is easier to be
applied for experimentists. Simulation with realistic experi-
mental parameters also shows that our protocol has a promis-
ing performance, and thus can be applied to practical QKD
applications. Without changing the experiment apparatus, one
can achieve a higher security level with fewer assumptions
about source device for the existing MDI-QKD experiments
[44–50].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we pro-
vide a short review on the 1SDI-QKD and a concrete secu-
rity analysis. In Sec. III, we present a single-photon version
of 1SMDI-QKD, derive the key rate formula with uncondi-
tional security, and make a discussion on the assumptions we
used. In Sec. IV A, we present a decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD.
In Sec. IV B, we derive the secure key rate for decoy-state
1SMDI-QKD. In Sec. IV C, we provide methods for estimat-
ing the parameters used in the key rate formula. In Sec. V, we
show simulation results for the key rate by comparing between
1SMDI-QKD and MDI-QKD for, both cases of asymptotical
and finite decoy states situations. Finally, we give a summary
of this paper in Sec. VI.
II. ONE-SIDED DEVICE-INDEPENDENT QKD
A. Protocol description
In this subsection, we introduce the scheme for the non-
post-selected version of 1SDI-QKD [30]. Following 1SDI-
QKD, the non-post-selected version of the 1SDI-QKD proto-
col can be described as follows. Alice and Bob receive some
quantum systems from an untrusted external source. Alice
(Bob) can choose from two binary measurement operators, A1
and A2 (B1 and B2). Alice’s measurement device is untrusted,
which is treated as a black box with two possible settings and
two possible outputs each time. Bob’s measurement device
is trusted, which is assumed to make projective measurements
in some qubit subspace. After performing error correction and
privacy amplification, they extract a secret common key string
finally. The difference between the non-post-selected version
of the 1SDI-QKD protocol and original 1SDI-QKD is that all
the strings of classical bits Alice gets from measurements A1
are used for the key generation without post-selection.
B. Key rate for 1SDI-QKD
In this subsection we formulate the key rate for non-post-
selected 1SDI-QKD. A post-selected version can also be
found in Ref. [30]. We denote by Ai and Bi the strings of
classical bits Alice and Bob get from measurements Ai and
Bi. From the N-bit strings A1 and B1, Alice and Bob can ex-
tract a secret key of length [59, 60],
l ≈ Hεmin(B1|E)−Hεmax(A1|B1) (1)
where Hεmin(B1|E) denotes the smooth entropy of B1 con-
ditioned on Eve’s information E; Hεmax(A1|B1) denotes the
smooth max entropy of B1 conditioned on A1. From the gen-
eralized uncertainty relation, one has
Hεmin(B1|E)≥ qN−Hεmax(A2|B2)
Hεmax(A1|B1)≤ Nh(e1)
Hεmax(A2|B2)≤ Nh(e2)
(2)
where ei is the bit error rate between Ai and Bi, and q is a
parameter to depict how distinct Bob’s two measurements are.
For orthogonal qubit measurements, q = 1. Finally, one can
achieve the key rate r .= l/N for non-post-selected 1SDI-QKD
as follows
r ≥ 1−h(e1)−h(e2). (3)
III. SINGLE-PHOTON 1SMDI-QKD
In this section, we present a single-photon version of
1SMDI-QKD (see Fig. 1) in which single-photon sources are
used by Alice and Bob. We leave a more practical setup using
the weak coherent source state for implementation purposes
in Sec. IV.
A. Protocol description
The single-photon 1SMDI-QKD protocol runs as follows.
Suppose that both Alice and Bob prepare single photons in
the four BB84 states (|0〉 , |1〉 , |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉± |1〉), where
|0〉 , |1〉 are the eigenstates of σz, and |±〉 are the eigenstates
of σx) [61]. Alice’s encoding system is uncharacterized, i.e.,
it can be treated as a gray box which receives encoding infor-
mation and outputs quantum state in two-dimensional Hilbert
space (shown in Fig. 1). Alice and Bob send photons to the
untrusted relay, Charlie, who performs a Bell state measure-
ment (BSM) and projects the received pulses into one of the
Bell states (|φ±〉 = 1√
2
|00〉± |11〉 , |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉± |10〉)).
Then Charlie announces the BSM measurement results among
a public classical channel. Afterward, Alice and Bob estimate
the quantum phase error and quantum bit error rate (QBER).
3They then perform error correction to get a correct key bits
string and privacy amplification to remove the information ob-
tained by any possible eavesdropper Eve. Finally, they obtain
a correct and secure key bits string that can be used for later
secure communication.
A1/A2 B1/B2
Alice
BSM
BobCharlie
FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of 1SMDI-QKD. BSM denotes Bell state
measurement; Ai and Bi (i ∈ {1,2}) denote the encoding basis of
Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob prepare some quantum states and
send them to an untrusted relay, Charlie, who is supposed to perform
BSM and broadcast the results. Bob’s encoding system is trusted,
while Alice’s is uncharacterized and assumed to output the quantum
state in two-dimensional Hilbert space. The white box denotes the
trusted device, the black box denotes the untrusted device, and the
gray box denotes the uncharacterized device.
B. Key rate for single-photon 1SMDI-QKD
Similar to MDI-QKD, here we consider a virtual-photon
qubit idea (see Fig. 2). Alice’s encoding system can be treated
as a trusted EPR source with an untrusted projective measure-
ment. Bob’s encoding system can be treated as a trusted EPR
source with a trusted projective measurement. Using the time-
reversed idea, we can perform the projective measurement on
Alice’s and Bob’s side after the BSM is performed. Thus, we
can treat the two EPR sources and the BSM in the middle as
an untrusted EPR source which outputs qubits to Alice and
Bob. This is exactly the 1SDI-QKD in which an EPR source
outputs qubits to Alice and Bob. Therefore one can get the
key rate for our 1SMDI-QKD directly from Eq. (3) for the
non-post-selected 1SDI-QKD, which reads
r ≥ 1−h(e1)−h(e2) (4)
where e1 and e2 is the bit error rate in the Z and X bases,
respectively.
C. Discussions on the assumptions
An important assumption in our single-photon 1SMDI-
QKD is that the dimension of Alice’s encoding system output
is fixed. By taking an example of dimension two (i.e. qubit),
we will prove that this assumption is necessary for security
purposes. We will demonstrate that when the dimension of
Alice’s encoding system output is not fixed, the protocol will
be totally insecure. We prove this by constructing a specific
attack scheme, in which Charlie can get all the information
EPR
Charles BobAlice
EPR
Qubit BB84 states
BSM
BSMEPR EPR
EPR
B1/B2A1/A2
Charles BobAlice
Charles BobAlice
Charles BobAlice
Qubit Qubit
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
BSM
FIG. 2. EPR denotes Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state; BSM de-
notes the Bell state measurement. (a) Single-photon 1SMDI-QKD
in which Alice’s encoding system is uncharacterized. (b) Virtual-
photon single-photon 1SMDI-QKD using the EPR source. Instead
of preparing a BB84 state, Alice and Bob prepares an perfect EPR
pair and sends one particle to an untrusted relay, Charlie, who per-
forms BSM and broadcasts the measurement results. Alice and Bob
measure their particles using the A1/A2 and B1/B2 bases, respec-
tively. Alice’s EPR source is perfect while the local detector is un-
trusted. This is equivalent to saying that Alice’s encoding system is
uncharacterized, implying the qubit state from Alice’s encoding sys-
tem [see Fig. 2 (a)] is basis independent. (c) Time-reversed single-
photon 1SMDI-QKD. Since their measurement operations are com-
mutable, the order of the measurements can be reversed. That is, Al-
ice and Bob can perform the projective measurement after the BSM
is performed. (d) Equivalent EPR-based 1SDI-QKD protocol. This
is exactly the 1SDI-QKD in which an EPR source outputs qubits to
Alice and Bob, and its security has been proven in Sec. II. The black,
white, and gray boxes denote the untrusted, trusted, and uncharacter-
ized parts, respectively.
without introducing any error. Indeed, if the dimension of Al-
ice’s encoding system is not fixed, it can encode the four BB84
states into four orthogonal states in four-dimensional Hilbert
space (for instance, four Bell states). So Charlie can simply
perform a four-dimensional projective measurement to distin-
guish the four orthogonal states. Then Charlie can perform
a projective measurement on the photon sent by Bob accord-
ing to the states sent by Alice. To be specific, when Alice
sends state |0〉, Charlie performs the Z basis projective mea-
surement, and the measurement result is denoted by Mz. If
Mz =+, then Charlie reports |φ+〉, |φ−〉 randomly with equal
probability; if Mz = −, then Charlie reports |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉 ran-
domly with equal probability. From Table I we can see that
Charlie can simulate the same probability tables that can be
obtained when genuine BB84 states sent by Alice and actual
BSM performed by Charlie. Therefore, Alice and Bob cannot
distinguish whether Alice’s encoding system sends genuine
BB84 states or four orthogonal four-dimensional states. That
is to say, Charlie can get all the information without intro-
ducing any error. Thus the security can’t be guaranteed. To
remove this kind of attack, one must restrict that the dimen-
4sion of Alice’s encoding system output is fixed. The qubit as-
sumption is commonly made in various QKD protocols such
as decoy-state BB84 [62–64] and MDI-QKD [42]. In fact an
experimental method for verifying the qubit assumption can
be easily implemented as proposed in Ref. [56]. To guarantee
the qubit assumption, ones needs only to verify that Alice’s
encoding system has the same mode except in the encoding
degree of freedom. For example, Alice’s phase modulator
should have the same timing, spectral, spatial, and polariza-
tion mode for different encoding phases in the phase-encoding
system.
An uncharacterized encoding system can be treated as a
perfect EPR source with an untrusted measurement, which
implies that the qubit state from Alice’s encoding system is
basis independent. To check the basis-independent assump-
tion in experiment, one needs to test the fidelity between the
states sent out by Alice ρZA and ρ
X
A , where either the X or Z ba-
sis is used. If the fidelity is close to unity, one can accept the
basis-independent assumption, and vice versa. Considering
that most errors come from the inaccuracy or uncharacterized
polarization modulator in the realistic experiment, the basis
independent is satisfied in most cases.
TABLE I. List of possible clicks for the case where Alice sends |+z〉
and Bob sends one of the four BB84 states. No loss is considered.
Alice Bob Possible clicks Mz =+ Mz =−
|0〉 |0〉 |φ+〉, |φ−〉 1 0
|0〉 |1〉 |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉 0 1
|0〉 |+〉 All 1/2 1/2
|0〉 |−〉 All 1/2 1/2
IV. DECOY-STATE 1SMDI-QKD
Since the single-photon source is difficult to realize in a
real experiment mainly due to high cost, the weak coherent
state is widely used in quantum information processing tasks.
However, the nonzero probability of multiphoton pulses in the
weak coherent pulses may cause the photon-number-splitting
(PNS) attack [65, 66]. Hence, the decoy-state method [62–64]
is employed to defeat the multiphoton events in the weak co-
herent states. In the decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD, one naturally
assumes that the single-photon portion of the coherent pulses
is basis-independent qubit. In this section, we will present
the decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD using the coherent light as the
source, derive the secure key rate for decoy-state 1SMDI-
QKD, and provide practical methods for estimating the pa-
rameters.
A. Protocol dsescription
The basic setup of the decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD using po-
larization encoding is illustrated in Fig. 3. The decoy-state
1SMDI-QKD protocol runs as follows. Suppose that both
Alice and Bob prepare random BB84 states with phase ran-
domized weak coherent pulses (WCPs) , in combination with
decoy states. They send the pulses to the untrusted relay,
Charlie, who performs the Bell state measurement (BSM) that
projects the received states into a Bell state. Then Charlie an-
nounces his BSM measurement results among a public classi-
cal channel. Afterward, Alice and Bob estimate the gain and
QBER of single-photon contributions using the decoy state
method [63, 64]. Finally, they generate a correct and secure
key bits string after performing error correction and privacy
amplification.
IMPMWCP
Alice
WCPPMIM
Bob
PBS PBS
BS
D1
D4
D3
D2
Charlie
FIG. 3. Basic setup of a decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD protocol. WCP
denotes the weak coherent pulse, PM denotes the polarization mod-
ulator, IM denotes the intensity modulator, BS denotes beam splitter,
PBS denotes polarization beam splitter, and D1, D2, D3, and D4
denote single-photon detectors. Alice and Bob prepare WCPs in a
different BB84 polarization state randomly, then send them to Char-
lie to perform the Bell state measurement. A click in D1 and D4,
or in D2 and D3, indicates a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉 =
(|HV 〉− |VH〉)/√2, and a click in D1 and D2, or in D3 and D4 in-
dicates a projection into the Bell state |ψ+〉 = (|HV 〉+ |VH〉)/√2.
The black, white, and dashed boxes denote the untrusted, trusted, and
uncharacterized parts, respectively.
B. Key rate for decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD
In this subsection, we present a concise security analysis
and derive the key rate for decoy-state 1SMDI-QKD. Since we
have proven the security of single-photon 1SMDI-QKD, here
we extend it to the coherent light source situation following
the idea of GLLP methods [67].
From the information theory, the key rate is lower bounded
by [6]
R= I(A : B)−χ(B : E), (5)
where I(A : B) denotes the mutual information between Alice
and Bob, and χ(B : E) denotes the possible information of
Eve. The first term I(A : B) quantifies the amount of classical
information between Alice and Bob after error correction. The
second term χ(B : E) estimates Eve’s knowledge on the raw
key, which will be reduced to an arbitrarily small amount after
privacy amplification.
Denote by Ai and Bi the random bits of Alice and Bob post-
selected based on a successful Bell measurement along Ai and
Bi bases for i = 1,2. The A1, B1 denotes the Z basis, A2, B2
5denotes the X basis when BB84 states are used. Here we as-
sume that the final key is extracted from the data measured in
the Z basis. The mutual information between A1 and B1, con-
sidering the information leaked in the error-correction process
is given by
I(A1 : B1) = 1− f ·H(EZZµν ), (6)
where EZZµν denotes the QBER with intensities µ and ν when
Alice and Bob both use the Z basis, µ(ν) is the mean photon
number of Alice’s (Bob’s) signal state, and f > 1 is the error
correction inefficiency for the error correction process. De-
note by QZZµν the overall gain with intensities µ and ν when
Alice and Bob both use the Z basis, then the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob is given by
I(A : B) = QZZµν · (1− f ·H(EZZµν )), (7)
Following the idea of GLLP methods [67], all the possible
information of Eve can be divided into tagged and untagged
portions, in which the tagged portion comes from the mul-
tiphoton pulses, while the untagged portion comes from the
single-photon pulses. So the information of Eve can be writ-
ten as
χ(B : E) = χ t(B : E)+χu(B : E),
χ t(B : E) = QZZµν −QZZ11 ,
χu(B : E) = QZZ11 ·H(eXX11 ),
(8)
where the superscripts t and u denote tagged and untagged
portions, respectively. QZZ11 denotes the overall gain in the Z
basis, and eXX11 denotes the bit error rate of the X basis when
Alice and Bob sends a single photon.
Finally, we derive the lower bound of the secure key rate as
follows
R= QZZ11 (1−H(eXX11 ))−QZZµν · f ·H(EZZµν ). (9)
In a realistic experiment, QZZµν and E
ZZ
µν can be directly ob-
tained from the experimental measurements results, while
QZZ11 and e
XX
11 can be estimated by the decoy method, which
will be illustrated in the next subsection.
C. Parameter estimation
For simulation purposes, we evaluate the overall gain and
QBER when Alice and Bob prepare phase-randomized WCPs.
The overall gain and QBER, in the situation without eaves-
dropping, are the same as MDI-QKD, and can be written as
follows [68]:
QXXµν = 2y
2(1+2y2−4yI0(x)+ I0(2x)),
EXXµν Q
XX
µν = e0Qµν −2(e0− ed)y2(I0(2x)−1),
(10)
and
QZZµν = Q
Z
C+Q
Z
E , E
ZZ
µνQ
ZZ
µν = edQ
Z
C+(1− ed)QZE , (11)
where
QZC =2(1− pd)2e−
ω
2 (1− (1− pd)e−
µηa
2 )× (1− (1− pd)e−
νηb
2 ),
QZE =2pd(1− pd)2e−
ω
2 (I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−
ω
2 ).
(12)
In the above equations, QZC, Q
Z
E denote the gains from
the correct and false BSM results, respectively. I0(·) is the
first kind modified Bessel function, ed represents the mis-
alignment error probability, pd is the background count rate,
e0 = 1/2, ω = µηa+νηb, x =
√µνηaηb
2 , y = (1− pd)e−ω/4,
and ηa = ηb = ηd × 10−αL/20 is the total efficiency (both
channel transmittance efficiency and detection efficiency ηd
included) for Alice and Bob, respectively.
Without Eve’s intervention, the yield in Z basis Y ZZ11 and bit
error rate with single-photon states in X basis eXX11 are given
as fllows:
QZZ11 =µνe
−µ−νY ZZ11 ,
Y ZZ11 =Y
XX
11 = (1− pd)2(
ηaηb
2
+(2ηa+2ηb−3ηaηb)pd
+4(1−ηa)(1−ηb)p2d),
eXX11 Y
XX
11 =e0Y
XX
11 − (e0− ed)(1− pd)2
ηaηb
2
.
(13)
In a practical experiment, the length of the raw key and the
number of decoy states are finite. Here, we consider a vacuum
+ weak-decoy-state method to obtain QZZ11 and e
XX
11 . In general,
Alice and Bob can use µ0, ν0, µ1, ν1 as the decoy state, and
µ2, ν2 as the signal state, in which µ2 = ν2 > µ1 = ν1 > µ0 =
ν0 = 0. The lower bound of Y ZZ11 ,Y
XX
11 and the upper bound of
eXX11 are given as follows [69] :
YL11 ≥
1
µ22µ
2
1 (µ2−µ1)
(µ32 (e
2µ1Qµ1µ1 +Q00− eµ1Qµ10− eµ1Q0µ1)
−µ31 (e2µ2Qµ2µ2 +Q00− eµ2Qµ20− eµ2Q0µ2)), (14)
eXXU11 ≤
1
µ1ν1YXX11
(QXX00 E
XX
00 + e
µ1+ν1QXXµ1ν1E
XX
µν
− eµ1QXXµ10EXXµ10− eν1QXX0ν1EXX0ν1 ), (15)
in which Eq. (14) is applicable to the Z and X bases.
We add a trustworthiness parameter ηs to depict the trust-
worthiness of Alice’s source abstractly. This parameter re-
sults from the imperfect preparation of states on Alice’s side.
The ηs denotes the probability of Alice’s encoding system
outputting the exact BB84 states. For the case Alice doesn’t
send the right state, we assume that 50% error is introduced
in terms of the worst case. We note that the assumption of
50% error is equivalent to the assumption of white noise on
Alice’s encoding device. Considering the trustworthiness of
Alice’s source, the gains and QBERs used for simulation can
be written as
QZZ
′
µν = Q
ZZ
µν , Q
ZZ′
11 = Q
ZZ
11
EZZ
′
µν = ηsE
ZZ
µν +
1
2
(1−ηs)
eXX
′
11 = ηse
XX
11 +
1
2
(1−ηs).
(16)
6V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a setup of our proposal with practical experi-
mental parameters from Ref. [47], which are listed in Table
II. We assume that all detectors have the same dark count
rates and the same detection efficiencies. For simplicity, we
only consider the asymptotic data case. One can extend the
analysis to the finite-data case by following the procedures in
Refs. [70, 71].
TABLE II. List of experimental parameters used for simulation. ηd
is the detection efficiency; ed is the misalignment-error probability
of the system; pd is the dark count rate of the detector; f is error
correction efficiency; α is the intrinsic loss coefficient of the standard
telecom fiber channel.
ηd ed pd f α(dB/km)
40% 1.5% 3×10−6 1.16 0.2
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Lower bound on the secret key rate R ver-
sus communication distance between Alice and Bob. The exper-
imental parameters used are listed in Table II. The solid line de-
notes the asymptotic case, and the dashed line denotes the two de-
coy states case. The different color corresponds to different ηs. In
particular, the red line denotes ηs = 1, i.e., the MDI-QKD proto-
col. The intensities of the signal state used by Alice and Bob are
optimized for the asymptotic case, and are 0.45,0.3,0.1,0.05, for
ηs = 1,0.95,0.9,0.85, respectively. The intensity of the decoy states
are fixed at 0.01 and 0.
The secure key rates of the 1SMDI-QKD in the asymptotic
case and two decoy states case with different source efficien-
cies ηs are shown in Fig. 4. The simulation results of the
MDI-QKD protocol are also illustrated with the red curve in
the figure for comparison. We can find that the secure key rate
and largest secure communication length of 1SMDI-QKD are
slightly lower than that of MDI-QKD, both in the asymptoti-
cal case and finite decoy states case. Moreover, the secure key
rate and the largest secure communication distance decrease
when the source efficiency ηs decreases. This makes sense
since 1SMDI-QKD requires fewer security assumptions than
MDI-QKD. The lower largest secure communication distance
is the price to pay in order to make Alice’s device more un-
characterized. The simulation results show that 1SMDI-QKD
can tolerate high-loss and low trustworthiness of Alice’s en-
coding system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have provided a 1SMDI protocol, which
enjoys the detection loophole-free advantage, and at the same
time weakens the state preparation assumption in MDI-QKD.
For the practical implementation, we also provide a scheme by
utilizing coherent light source with an analytical decoy state
method. The simulation results show that our protocol has a
promising performance, and thus can be applied to real-life
QKD applications. Besides, our proposal can be implemented
with standard linear optical elements with low detection ef-
ficiency over a high-loss channel. Therefore, it is unneces-
sary to modify the existing MDI-QKD experiment apparatus,
except to guarantee that Alice’s encoding states are in two-
dimensional Hilbert space. With the merit of lower require-
ment, we believe that our proposal is a significant improve-
ment for MDI-QKD under the more realistic situation and
paves the way towards the implementations of fully DI-QKD.
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